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given region can be small. This would
make it difficult to recruit enough
controls within the small areas affect-
ed by most outbreaks, particularly
within specific age strata. A control
bank may therefore be more practical
for use in large communitywide out-
breaks, outbreaks that occur over
large regions (i.e., an entire state), or
in densely populated areas.
Additionally, the lengthy start-up time
required for questionnaire program-
ming with a CATI system also sup-
ports the view that the CATI method
may be maximally applicable in large-
scale investigations. 
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Lack of
Transmission of
Vaccinia Virus
To the Editor: Recently, the US
government completed a targeted vac-
cination strategy limited to healthcare
workers, first responders, and the mil-
itary because of concern that variola
virus, the etiologic agent of smallpox,
might be used as a biowarfare agent
(1). Aconcern in such programs is the
potential for unintended spread of the
vaccine virus (vaccinia) from the pri-
mary vaccinee to contacts who may
be at the greatest risk of having
adverse reactions resulting from sec-
ondary transmission (2,3).
Contact spread of the live attenuat-
ed vaccinia virus is considered the
predominant method of secondary
transmission. The conventional meth-
ods of preventing a secondary trans-
mission event in the household of a
smallpox vaccine recipient include
the use of bandages and long sleeves
to limit direct contact with the lesion
and immediate hand-washing when
contact occurs (4). 
Several recent reports have meas-
ured the presence of vaccinia virus on
the dressings or hands of vaccinated
persons; however, the recovery of
vaccinia virus in the environment has
not been evaluated after vaccination
in a controlled setting (5–7). We pres-
ent the first reported attempt to recov-
er live vaccinia virus from the homes
of recently vaccinated persons. This
study was approved by the St. Louis
University Institutional Review
Board. We hypothesized that live vac-
cinia virus shed from the skin reaction
could not be recovered in the natural
environment, and as a result, consti-
tutes a limited risk for contact trans-
mission.
Three hundred eighty-seven envi-
ronmental swab samples were collect-
ed on 3 different study days from 43
persons (mean age 24 years) with
major cutaneous reactions. Persons
who participated in this study were
selected from a randomized, double-
blind, single-center study that com-
pared the safety, tolerability, and
immunogenicity of 3 smallpox vac-
cines (8,9). Following vaccination
and after each study visit, the vaccina-
tion site was covered with an OpSite
Post-Op dressing (Smith and Nephew,
Massilon, OH, USA). On postvaccina-
tion days 7, 10, and 15, a sterile
Calgiswab type 2 applicator (Harwood
Products Co., Guilford, ME, USA),
moistened in sterile water, was rotated
over the linen from the study partici-
pant’s bed (approximate location of
sleeping area), the middle of his or her
bath towel, and the inside area of a
shirt sleeve adjacent to the vaccina-
tion bandage (before laundering).
These sampling areas were chosen on
the basis of the likelihood of exposure
to the semipermeable bandage and the
potential for another person to come
in contact with the vaccinia virus in
these areas. An additional 129 sam-
ples from the palm of the study partic-
ipant’s hand used to take the environ-
mental samples were taken to serve as
a control mechanism. 
After sampling, the tip of the swab
was stored in a 15-mL conical tube
containing 3 mL multimicrobe trans-
port media (Remel, Lenexa, KS,
USA). The 15-mL conical tubes were
returned to the clinic in a cooler on
cold packs the same day. Recovery of
vaccinia virus was determined by
infectivity assay. Samples were tested
for infectious vaccinia virus by inocu-
lation of fluid cultures of Vero cells
grown in 12-well plates. A sample
was defined as positive if cytopathic
effects were observed (10). 
Concurrent with the environmental
sampling, the lesion and the outside of
the bandage covering the inoculation
site for each study participant were
swabbed with a Calgiswab Type 2
sterile applicator, and the samples
were analyzed by infectivity assay.
These samples served as a positive
control, indicating that the method
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used to sample the environment was
appropriate and sensitive. 
All 516 environmental samples
from designated sampling areas in the
homes of recently vaccinated vac-
cinia-naive persons were negative for
live virus as determined by plaque
infectivity assay (Table). Only 1
(0.78%) of 129 dressing samples test-
ed on day 7 had measurable titers of
vaccinia. 
Contact with live vaccinia virus
from the lesion at the site of vaccina-
tion is the underlying cause of second-
ary transmission. Common mecha-
nisms for transmission include con-
tact with contaminated bandages and
intimate sexual contact. Recent stud-
ies have compared a variety of band-
ages used to cover the vaccination site
to determine which class of bandage
provides the greatest protection
against disseminated virus. Talbot et
al. observed that <1% (N = 918) of
dressing samples were positive for
vaccinia (an initial semipermeable
OpSite Post-Op dressing and an outer
semipermeable Tegaderm bandage)
(5). In a single-blind randomized trial
design, Waibel et al. compared the
presence of vaccinia virus on the
external surface of 3 different types of
bandages and noted that the semiper-
meable membrane with gauze had the
smallest proportion of recoverable
virus compared with the groups that
used a Band-Aid or double gauze with
adherent tape (6). Despite the differ-
ence in types of bandages from these
studies, the results were remarkably
consistent with regard to the limited
dissemination of vaccinia virus out-
side the dressing. In concordance with
our results, the semipermeable band-
age provided significant protection
from exposure to the virus on the out-
side of the bandage. 
This study presented many chal-
lenges regarding the sampling and
collection of specimens. Collection
times, sampling technique, and envi-
ronmental conditions may have con-
tributed to the absence of viral recov-
ery. In addition, we chose to measure
live vaccinia virus as opposed to non-
infectious viral genomes (by poly-
merase chain reaction) because we
were concerned with transmission and
infectivity. If we had chosen to meas-
ure noninfectious viral genomes, a
positive outcome may have been like-
ly. However, from a public health
standpoint, such information would
have been less valuable. Further stud-
ies will need to examine the viability
of vaccinia virus in the environment
to evaluate the possibility of contact
transmission. 
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Discrimination
between Highly
Pathogenic and
Low Pathogenic H5
Avian Influenza A
Viruses
To the Editor: To thoroughly
investigate avian influenza outbreaks,
identifying highly pathogenic avian
influenza (HPAI) and low pathogenic
avian influenza (LPAI) is essential.
Currently, determination of inserted
basic amino acids within the hemag-
glutinin cleavage site of HPAI relies
on nucleotide sequencing (1–3).
Direct sequencing is relatively time-
consuming and laborious and thus is
not suitable for local and regional
diagnostic laboratories that receive
large numbers of samples that may
contain HPAI or LPAI subtype H5N1.
Therefore, a rapid diagnostic assay
was developed to discriminate
between HPAI and LPAI subtype H5
viruses by 1-step real-time reverse
transcription–polymerase chain reac-
tion (RT-PCR) with melting curve
analysis. 
H5 primers flanking the cleavage
site were designed from conserved
regions among HPAI and LPAI strains
by using nucleotide sequences
obtained from GenBank and our pre-
vious studies (4–6). The primers con-
sisted of a forward primer H5F3+
(nucleotides 1001–1021: 5′-AACA-
GATTAGTCCTTGCGACTG-3′) and
a reverse primer H5R2+ (nucleotides
1124–1103: 5′-CATCTACCATTCC-
CTGCCATCC-3′), which yielded
products of ≈124 bp and ≈112 bp, cor-
responding to HPAI and LPAI,
respectively. Consequently, the sizes
of the amplicons and percentage gua-
nine-cytosine content were different,
allowing discrimination between
HPAI and LPAI by melting curve
analysis (7). 
One-step, real-time RT-PCR with
melting curve analysis was performed
in an ABI 7500 system (Applied
Biosystems, Foster City, CA, USA).
In each reaction, 3.0 µL of RNA sam-
ple was combined with a reaction
mixture containing 10 µL 2× SYBR
Green PCR Master Mix (Applied
Biosystems), 0.5 µL 40× MultiScribe
(Applied Biosystems) and RNase
inhibitor, each primer (at final con-
centration of 0.5 µmol/L), 1.5
mmol/LMgCl2, and RNase-free water
in a final volume of 20 µL. The ther-
mal profile began with incubation at
48°C for 45 min (reverse transcrip-
tion), then incubation at 95°C for 10
min (predenaturation), followed by 40
cycles of amplification alternating
between 94°C for 15 s (denaturation)
and 68°C for 40 s (annealing/exten-
sion). The SYBR Green I fluorescent
signal was obtained once per cycle at
the end of the extension step. After
amplification, melting curve analysis
was performed by heating the sample
to 95°C for 15 s, then cooling it to
70°C for 1 min, followed by a linear
temperature increase to 95°C at a rate
of 0.5°C/s, while continuously moni-
toring the fluorescent signal. Data
were analyzed by the 7500 System
SDS Software version 1.2 (Applied
Biosystems).
To develop the assay, samples pre-
viously identified as influenza
A/chicken/Nakorn-Patom/Thailand/
CU-K2/04 (H5N1) served as a control
for HPAI, and A/duck/Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region,
People’s Republic of China/308/78
(H5N3) served as a control for LPAI.
The H5 genes (nucleotides 914–1728)
of each strain were inserted into
pGEM-T Easy Vector and then tran-
scribed in vitro by using RiboMAX
Large Scale RNAProduction System-
T7 (Promega, Madison, WI, USA).
Serial 10-fold dilutions of the stan-
dard H5 RNAwere subjected to a sen-
sitivity test (8). The fluorescent signal
can be detected at RNA dilutions as
low as 102 copies/µL. To assess the
specificity, viral RNA extracted from
other subtypes of influenza A viruses
(H1–H4 and H6–H15) was tested.
The assay was specific for the H5 sub-
type, since no amplification was
detected from other subtypes. 
Three preliminary melting curve
analyses showed that this assay was
effective in discriminating between
the melting peaks of HPAI and LPAI
(Figure). The variations of melting
temperature (Tm) between runs were
experimentally determined. The mean
(standard deviation) of Tm values for
HPAI and LPAI were 77.43°C
(0.21°C) and 79.57°C (0.23°C),
respectively. This assay provided high
reliability and reproducibility, since
the coefficients of variation were
<0.30.
Seventy-eight specimens of
influenza Avirus were used to validate
the assay. The 75 HPAI samples were
isolated during the 2004 outbreak in
Thailand; 3 LPAI samples, including
A/avian/NY/01 (H5N2), A/Chicken/
Mexico/31381–3/94 (H5N2), and
A/shoveler/Egypt/03 (H5N2), were
provided by the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention. The viruses
were isolated in embryonated chicken